From b9b2830c8127008a742ba9529a6a64d8d87deb18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alice Wang <aliceywang@google.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 18:41:00 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] [km] Add a new rust binary for non-secure KeyMint host

The new binary sets non-secure RoT for keymint. The non-secure
version will be used on cuttlefish.

Bug: 355194622
Test: CF is gets booted with KeyMint TA in VM
Change-Id: Iff202c6d4bb70dabeb866b4f3fbc18c006bb219e
---
 trusty/keymint/Android.bp              | 22 ++++++++++++++----
 trusty/keymint/src/keymint_hal_main.rs | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/trusty/keymint/Android.bp b/trusty/keymint/Android.bp
index 92d9c6fbb..1b87d806f 100644
--- a/trusty/keymint/Android.bp
+++ b/trusty/keymint/Android.bp
@@ -17,12 +17,10 @@ package {
     default_applicable_licenses: ["Android-Apache-2.0"],
 }
 
-rust_binary {
-    name: "android.hardware.security.keymint-service.rust.trusty",
+rust_defaults {
+    name: "android.hardware.security.keymint-service.rust.trusty.default",
     relative_install_path: "hw",
     vendor: true,
-    init_rc: ["android.hardware.security.keymint-service.rust.trusty.rc"],
-    vintf_fragments: ["android.hardware.security.keymint-service.rust.trusty.xml"],
     srcs: [
         "src/keymint_hal_main.rs",
     ],
@@ -37,7 +35,23 @@ rust_binary {
         "liblog_rust",
     ],
     prefer_rlib: true,
+}
+
+rust_binary {
+    name: "android.hardware.security.keymint-service.rust.trusty",
+    defaults: ["android.hardware.security.keymint-service.rust.trusty.default"],
+    init_rc: ["android.hardware.security.keymint-service.rust.trusty.rc"],
+    vintf_fragments: ["android.hardware.security.keymint-service.rust.trusty.xml"],
     required: [
         "android.hardware.hardware_keystore.xml",
     ],
 }
+
+rust_binary {
+    name: "android.hardware.security.keymint-service.rust.trusty.nonsecure",
+    defaults: ["android.hardware.security.keymint-service.rust.trusty.default"],
+    features: ["nonsecure"],
+    rustlibs: [
+        "libkmr_hal_nonsecure",
+    ],
+}
diff --git a/trusty/keymint/src/keymint_hal_main.rs b/trusty/keymint/src/keymint_hal_main.rs
index 3c5627bd1..a0b1d792c 100644
--- a/trusty/keymint/src/keymint_hal_main.rs
+++ b/trusty/keymint/src/keymint_hal_main.rs
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ use clap::Parser;
 use kmr_hal::{
     extract_rsp, keymint, rpc, secureclock, send_hal_info, sharedsecret, SerializedChannel,
 };
-use log::{error, info};
+use log::{error, info, warn};
 use std::{
     ffi::CString,
     ops::DerefMut,
@@ -109,7 +109,11 @@ fn inner_main() -> Result<(), HalServiceError> {
         error!("{}", panic_info);
     }));
 
-    info!("Trusty KM HAL service is starting.");
+    if cfg!(feature = "nonsecure") {
+        warn!("Non-secure Trusty KM HAL service is starting.");
+    } else {
+        info!("Trusty KM HAL service is starting.");
+    }
 
     info!("Starting thread pool now.");
     binder::ProcessState::start_thread_pool();
@@ -126,6 +130,29 @@ fn inner_main() -> Result<(), HalServiceError> {
         )?;
     let tipc_channel = Arc::new(Mutex::new(TipcChannel(connection)));
 
+    #[cfg(feature = "nonsecure")]
+    {
+        // When the non-secure feature is enabled, retrieve root-of-trust information
+        // (with the exception of the verified boot key hash) from Android properties, and
+        // populate the TA with this information. On a real device, the bootloader should
+        // provide this data to the TA directly.
+        let boot_req = kmr_hal_nonsecure::get_boot_info();
+        info!("boot/HAL->TA: boot info is {:?}", boot_req);
+        kmr_hal::send_boot_info(tipc_channel.lock().unwrap().deref_mut(), boot_req)
+            .map_err(|e| HalServiceError(format!("Failed to send boot info: {:?}", e)))?;
+        // When the non-secure feature is enabled, also retrieve device ID information
+        // (except for IMEI/MEID values) from Android properties and populate the TA with
+        // this information. On a real device, a factory provisioning process would populate
+        // this information.
+        let attest_ids = kmr_hal_nonsecure::attestation_id_info();
+        if let Err(e) =
+            kmr_hal::send_attest_ids(tipc_channel.lock().unwrap().deref_mut(), attest_ids)
+        {
+            error!("Failed to send attestation ID info: {:?}", e);
+        }
+        info!("Successfully sent non-secure boot info and attestation IDs to the TA.");
+    }
+
     // Register the Keymint service
     let km_service = keymint::Device::new_as_binder(tipc_channel.clone());
     let km_service_name = format!("{}/{}", KM_SERVICE_NAME, SERVICE_INSTANCE);