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Backport of Win-specific suppression of potentially rogue construct that can engage

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in directory traversal on the host.

Bug:209438553

Ignore-AOSP-First: Resolution for potential security exploit.

Test: Synced just system/core, therefore relying on presubmits for now.
Will followup with a full-fledged sync and manual cursory test.

Signed-off-by: Shaju Mathew <shaju@google.com>
Change-Id: I993a00ce6130478b7becfdbea816c348824f319f
Merged-In: Ie1f82db2fb14e1bdd183bf8d3d93d5e9f974be5d
This commit is contained in:
Shaju Mathew 2022-04-05 04:01:04 -07:00 • committed by Elliott Hughes
parent 0ed516e795
commit a36a342ec9
1 changed files with 12 additions and 0 deletions
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12
adb/client/file_sync_client.cpp
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@ -629,6 +629,18 @@ static bool sync_ls(SyncConnection& sc, const char* path,
if (!ReadFdExactly(sc.fd, buf, len)) return false; if (!ReadFdExactly(sc.fd, buf, len)) return false;
buf[len] = 0; buf[len] = 0;
// Address the unlikely scenario wherein a
// compromised device/service might be able to
// traverse across directories on the host. Let's
// shut that door!
if (strchr(buf, '/')
#if defined(_WIN32)
|| strchr(buf, '\\')
#endif
) {
return false;
}
func(msg.dent.mode, msg.dent.size, msg.dent.time, buf); func(msg.dent.mode, msg.dent.size, msg.dent.time, buf);
} }
} }