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Merge "Fix the trigger name for loading bpf programs." into main

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Treehugger Robot 2024-09-24 01:49:11 +00:00 • committed by Gerrit Code Review
commit b9e63943de
1 changed files with 15 additions and 2 deletions
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17
rootdir/init.rc
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@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ on late-init
trigger post-fs-data trigger post-fs-data
# Should be before netd, but after apex, properties and logging is available. # Should be before netd, but after apex, properties and logging is available.
trigger load_bpf_programs trigger load-bpf-programs
trigger bpf-progs-loaded trigger bpf-progs-loaded
# Now we can start zygote. # Now we can start zygote.
@ -1110,6 +1110,19 @@ on post-fs-data
on property:vold.checkpoint_committed=1 on property:vold.checkpoint_committed=1
trigger post-fs-data-checkpointed trigger post-fs-data-checkpointed
# It is important that we start bpfloader after:
# - /sys/fs/bpf is already mounted,
# - apex (incl. rollback) is initialized (so that we can load bpf
# programs shipped as part of apex mainline modules)
# - logd is ready for us to log stuff
#
# At the same time we want to be as early as possible to reduce races and thus
# failures (before memory is fragmented, and cpu is busy running tons of other
# stuff) and we absolutely want to be before netd and the system boot slot is
# considered to have booted successfully.
on load-bpf-programs
exec_start bpfloader
on bpf-progs-loaded on bpf-progs-loaded
start netd start netd
@ -1280,7 +1293,7 @@ on property:net.tcp_def_init_rwnd=*
# controlling access. On older kernels, the paranoid value is the only means of # controlling access. On older kernels, the paranoid value is the only means of
# controlling access. It is normally 3 (allow only root), but the shell user # controlling access. It is normally 3 (allow only root), but the shell user
# can lower it to 1 (allowing thread-scoped pofiling) via security.perf_harden. # can lower it to 1 (allowing thread-scoped pofiling) via security.perf_harden.
on load_bpf_programs && property:sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks=1 on load-bpf-programs && property:sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks=1
write /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid -1 write /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid -1
on property:security.perf_harden=0 && property:sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks="" on property:security.perf_harden=0 && property:sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks=""
write /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid 1 write /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid 1